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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
-vs.- Case No. 8731 
ANGELO JOE TELLAY, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
Angelo Joe Tellay was convicted of the crime of 
burglary in the second degree on February 20th, 1957, 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and sentenced 
to a term in the State Penitentiary by the Honorable 
::\fartin l\1. Larson, the Judge of said court, for a term 
of not less than one nor more than twenty years. The 
pertinent facts involved in this case may be stated as 
follows: That on June, the lOth, 1956, the defendant and 
his wife, Viola Tellay, called on a Mr. and Mrs. Rojas 
in the morning of said day, and continued to have a party 
on said day, during which time beer was drunk by Mr. 
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and Mrs. Tellay, and Mr. and Mrs. Roja.s, and two other 
friends, a Mr. and Mrs. Magerrin. The party continued 
all day, which happened to be Sunday, and the evidenc~ 
is that the only intoxicant that was consumed by the par-
ticipants was beer. That the defendant, together with 
the other members of the party, had a buffet 
supper at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Rojas in the evening 
of said day, and thereafter went out to buy more beer. 
It appears that the defendant and his wife, Viola Tellay, 
had been arguing and quarreling in the afternoon and 
continued to do so while riding in the panel truck owned 
by Mr. Magerrin, who was driving the truck on the trip 
to buy more beer, and near the Star Brass Foundry, on 
8th South and 4th West, the car stopped and the defend-
ant and ~Irs. Tellay got out. Mrs. Tellay stopped on the 
west side of said foundry on 4th \Y est. Mrs. Tellay 
testified that when they got out of the car she ripped the 
shirt off her husband, the defendant herein, (R. 83, line 
30) .and continued to argue with him on the street, and a 
l\fr. William Langford was sworn and testified for the 
State to the effect that on June lOth, 1956, he was em-
ployed by the American Fence Company as a salesman, 
and by the American Galvanizing Cmnpany .as a night 
watchn1an, and that the location of the American Galvan-
izing is at 513 West 8th South; that he resides at 471 
West 8th South, just ea.st of the Star Brass Foundry; 
that on the night of June lOth, 1956, he had observed 
a person tprough the light shining through from the west 
side of the building, who was moving about inside said 
Star Brass Foundry, and he thereafter immediately called 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
the police (R. 3G, line 30), and soon thereafter called Mr. 
George Thomas McGrath, Vice-President of the Star 
Bras.s Foundry & Refining Company, who went immedi-
ately to said Foundry. Mr. l\1cGrath himself testified 
that his company had just purchased some metal from 
Hill Field Air Base, which was at that time inside the 
foundry, and its value would be between $2500.00 and 
$3000.00, (R. 13 lines 11 to 13 inclusive). That the metals 
purchased from the Hill Field Air Base were brass cast-
ings, weighing about 20 pounds each, and that there were 
500 of them purchased. ( R. 24, 29 to R. 25, 4). In response 
to the telephone call placed by Langford, police officer 
Clarence Leonard Stenstrud, and his colleague, Officer 
Leo Johnson, drove to the Star Br.ass Foundry and found 
a woman standing under the tree at the north west corner 
of said foundry, who was later identified as Viola Tellay, 
the wife of the defendant; that a noise was heard inside 
of the foundry building, and that the defendant came out 
of a broken window in the presence of the officers, and 
was put under arrest. There is no evidence that the 
defendant took any property within the Star Brass 
Foundry. 11r. ).IcGrath, the Vice-President of said 
Foundry, testified that nothing was taken from their 
building (R. 25, 24 to 30). 
At the time the defendant was .arrested, several police 
officers had arrived on the scene, including two plain 
clothes officers. There is some evidence produced by the 
state to the effect that the lock on the west door of the 
foundry building had been broken (R. 21, lines 24 to 29 
inclusive). An information was filed against the defend-
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ant on the 13th day of July, 1956, charging him with 
burglary in the second degree, as follows: "That on or 
.about the lOth day of June, 1956, the said Angelo Joe 
Tellay, entered the building of the Star Brass Foundry 
& Refining Company, a Corporation, in the night time, 
with the intent to commit larceny therein." To which 
information the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. 
There is evidence to the effect that the defendant 
had been drinking beer all day long on the day of the 
alleged offense, and was under the influence of alcohol. 
(R. 84, 30; R. 85, 1 and 2). There is evidence to the ef-
fect that the defendant and his wife were going to 
Denver, Colorad'o, and that the party held at Roj.a's 
residence was a farewell party, given in their behalf 
( R. 8:2: 17, 18). There is evidence to the effect, on behalf 
of the state, that a crow bar, or pry bar, was found 
within the Star Br.ass Foundry building, and was entered 
into evidence (R. :23; 20-30). The defendant objected to 
the introduction of said bar on the grounds that it had 
not been properly identified, (R. Sl, lines 13 to 20 in-
clusive). A 1notion was n1ade on behalf of the defense 
to disn1iss the action on the grounds that the state had 
failed to prove the crin1e of burglary ( R. 81-5 to 11 in-
clu~ivP, and R. 97, 2-t to :26 inclusive), which motion was 
denied by the court (R.97, line :2/). The defendant also 
n1oved for a directed verdict (R.97~ lines 28 to R. 98-4 
inclusive). The nwtion was denied by the court (R. 98, 
5). 
At the trial held on February 20th, 1957, a verdict 
was returned by the jury finding the defendant guilty of 
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the crime of burglary in the 2nd degree, as charged in 
the information (R. 119A). A motion for a new trial on 
behalf of the defendant was made by his counsel and filed 
on February 25th, 1957, on the grounds (1) "That said 
verdict is not supported by, and is contrary to the law 
on the evidence." (2) "That the court had misdirected the 
jury in the nmtters of law, erred in the decisions of ques-
tions of law arising during the cour.se of the trial, and 
allowed acts (facts) in the cause prejudicial to the 
rights of the defendant." On said day, to wit: February 
25th, 1957, the court denied the defendant's motion for 
a new trial, (R. 121) from which motion the defendant 
prosecutes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY IN THE 
SE.COND DEGREE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY IN THE 
SE.COND DEGREE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In State v. Hutchings, 84 Pac. 893, this court said: 
"Under the law it was encumbent upon the 
jury to acquit the defendant, if the evidence relied 
upon could be reconciled upon any reasonable 
hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the 
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defendant. Especially is this rule applicable, 
where as here, it is sought to convict the accused 
wholly upon circumstantial evidence, and where 
the circumstances leave the mind in grave doubt 
as to the commission of the offense ; there being 
no direct proof of the corpus delicti." 
The gist of the defendant's defense is that hi.:; 
presence in the building, alleged to have been burglarized, 
taken alone, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction of 
burglary in the second degree, especially in view of the 
fact the defendant had been drinking beer all day long, 
at the time of the alleged offense and was not in full 
control of his mental faculties. Unless there was an 
intent on the part of the defendant to commit larceny 
within the building in which he is alleged to have entered, 
there could be no commission of the crime as charged. 
In Volume No. 1913C, American Annotated Cases, 
Page 517, the following is found: 
"It is an essential element of the crime of 
burglary that breaking and entering should be ac-
companied with an intent to steal or to commit 
some felony." 
On page 518 of the same report the following is 
found: 
"Burglary consists of .an intent, which must 
be executed, to break in the night time into a 
dwelling house; and further, concurrent intent, 
which may be executed or not, to con1mit therein 
some crime which is in law a felony." 
Bishop on Criminal Law quoted in State v. Meche, 
( 42 Lousiana Annotated 273) 
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"In these, and other like cases, the particular, 
or ulterior, intent must be proved, in .addition to 
the more general one, in order to make out the 
offense, and nothing will answer as a substitute." 
It is the contention of the defendant herein that no 
intent on the part of the defendant was proved by the 
State to make out a conviction since his unexplained pres-
ence in the building could not affirm that he w,a,s within 
the building for the purpose of committing the crime of 
larceny as charged in the information. 
In Black v. State (18 Texas Appeals 124) the court 
stated: 
"Evidence that a felony was actually com-
mitted is evidence that the house w.as broken and 
entered with intent to commit that offense, was 
the rule at common law. With us, however, the 
intent in burglary, is the essence of the offense, 
and fact; not, in deed, by expressed and positive 
testimony, but the best evidence of which the case 
is susceptible. That a breaking and entry of a 
house may and could occur without ,a violation of 
our statute against burglary needs no argument to 
prove or demonstrate. It might easily be sug-
gested that many breakings and entry into houses 
occur and do occur in which no intent to commit 
either a felony or a crime of theft ever entered 
the mind of the party making the entry." 
State v. Cowell (12 Nevada 337), holds: 
"It should be born in mind that in order to 
constitute the crime of burglary, the defendant 
must not only enter some one of the structures 
mentioned in the statutes at the time and in the 
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manner therein stated, but he must enter with in-
tent to commit .some one of the crimes specified. 
It is just as essential to prove intent as it is the 
entry. If both are not proven to the satisfaction 
of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt there can 
be no conviction. The Quo Animo constitutes an 
indispensable part of this crime, just as scienter 
does in forgery and counterfeiting; and the rule 
of evidence governing proof of each is the same.'' 
In the case of White v. State, a Texas case, 1938, 
113 S. W. 2nd, 530, the court stated: 
"To sustain a conviction on circumstantial evi-
dence, circumstances must be such as to e.stablish 
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt 
and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
consistent with his innocence." 
In Sullivan v. State, (7 Oklahoma Crilninal, 307; 123 
Pacific, 569), the court held : 
"In .an indictment or inforn1ation charging 
burglary, it is necessary for the allegation of in-
tent to be set out fully, in order to describe the 
crime, and the acts necessary to constitute the 
crime. It is not sufficient to say the accused in-
tended to steal or intended to conunit a felony 
therein." 
In State r. Cranford, a Ftah case. X ove1nber 'ith, 
1921, 201 Pacific, 1030, this court held: 
"The defendant n1ust be accorded the benefit 
of every reasonable doubt, and, in cases solely 
dependent on rircun1st.antial eYidence, the circum-
stances n1ust be such as to exclude eyen~ reason-
able h~vpothesis except that of guilt." · 
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In People v. Kennedy, (55 Calif. 201) the Supreme 
Court of California held: 
"The intent must be proved, just as any other 
fact of the case must be proved, by positive evi-
dence, or by positive evidence of fact, from which 
the intent can be inferred." 
In State v. JJierritt, (Utah case, June 9th, 1926, ~-±7 
Pacific, 497) this court held : 
''To warrant conviction, circumstantial evi-
dence must convince the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt that all facts and circumstances are true, 
and are incompatable with any reasonable hypo-
thesis other than the guilt of the accused." 
In State v. Wells (100 Pacific 681, 35 Utah 400) this 
court held: 
"In circumstantial evidence, circumstances 
must be proved which not only agree with, and 
concur to show, defendant's guilt, but are in-
consistent with any other reasonable conclusion."' 
In State v. Adamson, 125 Pacific 2nd 429, on page 
430 of the Report this court said: 
"A criminal case requires proof of each ele-
ment of the crime by evidence that convinces one 
beyond all reasonable doubts of the existence of 
each such element." 
In State v. Cohn, 232 Pacific 2nd 470, 171 Kansas 
344, the Kansas Supreme Court stated as follows: 
"Where the state relies on circumstantial 
evidence to establish guilt of defendant, evidence 
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must be so strong that every reasonable hypo-
thesis except the guilt of the defendant is ex-
cluded." 
In the case of State v. Clark, 223 Pacific 2nd 184, 
this court stated: 
"A criminal case requires proof of each ele-
ment of the crime by evidence that convinces one 
beyond all reasonable doubt of the existence of 
each such element." 
State v. Lawrence, 234 Pacific 2nd 600, where this 
court held: 
"A plea of not guilty by defendant in prosecu-
tion for grand larceny of automobile, passed on 
the state the burden of proving every essential 
element of the offense by evidence sufficient to 
convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 
"In criminal cases, the state has the burden 
of proving every essential element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and both as to proof 
of the state's case, and as to matters of defense, 
all that is necessary to entitle the defendant to 
acquittal is that there exists reasonable doubt as 
to his guilt." 
State v. Ilendricks, 258 Pacific 2nd ±5:2, a rtah case, 
holds: 
"Rule that all that is necessary to entitle a 
defendant to an acquittal is that there exists a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, applies whether 
the defendant offers any evidence or not." 
In PcojJlc v. Smith, :275 Pacific 2nd 919, 1:28 Calif. 
Appeals 2nd 706, also People v. Rascon, :274 Pacific 2nd 
899, 128 California Appeals 2nd 118, the court holds: 
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"Evidence that merely raises suspiCIOn, no 
matter how strong, of guilt of the person charged 
with a crime is not sufficient to sustain a verdict 
and judgment against him." 
In State v. Darlene Osmus, a Wyoming case, 276 
Pacific 2nd 469 : 
"Speculation, suspicion, surmises and guesses 
have no evidentiary value." 
CONCLUSION 
It is contended by the defendant that the mere fact 
that he was seen emerging from a broken window of the 
Star Brass Foundry and Refining Company building, 
located at 8th South and 4th West, on the night of June 
lOth, 1956 is not sufficient to warrant the jury finding 
that he was within the building and had gone into the 
building with the intention to commit larceny as charged 
in the information, but on the other hand the rule of law 
applicable to the circumstances involved that the jury 
may well have found upon a reasonable hypothesis that 
he was in there for some innocent purpose other than that 
of committing larceny. There is no evidence that any-
thing was taken from the building, no evidence that ,any-
thing was stolen, or missed in the inventory. At most the 
only thing that the defendant could be guilty of is a 
simple trespass, and the evidence does not warrant the 
jury in finding under these circumstances, that he entered 
the building with the intention to commit larceny, and 
thereby exclude every other hypothesis as to his inno-
cence. 
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It appears .at most, that, under the instructions given 
by the court, the jury concluded that the defendant had 
entered the building of the said Star Brass Foundry & 
Refining Company on said night to commit larceny based 
on mere suspicion, speculation and guess as to why he 
had entered the building, and the jury could have reason-
ably found that he entered for son1e innocent purpose 
other than that charged in the information. His mere 
unexplained presence within the building and his emer-
gence from the building in the presence of the police 
officers does not warrant the jury in excluding every 
other hypothesis of his innocence, and finding that he had 
only entered the building for the purpose of committing 
the larceny. 
In the case of Ashford v. State, a K ebraska case, 53 
N orwestern 1036, on page 1037 of the report the court 
states: 
"Again there is no evidence as to the intent 
with which the breaking and entering was done. 
It is charged in the infor1nation that the~T were 
made with the intent to steal and carry away the 
goods and chattels of J ettie Reynolds. That 
such was the purpose will not be presu1ned from 
the mere fact of breaking and entering into the 
building. It is conceded that nothing was stolen 
therefr01u by the defendant. Had there been, 
then, fron1 that fact, it 1night be inferred that the 
object and purpose of the accused was larceny. 
since the presun1ption is that eyery sane person 
is presu1ned to have intended that which his acts 
indicate his intentions to have been." 
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It is respectfully submitted therefore by the defend-
ant that his mere presence within the building and emer-
gence from the building through a broken window does 
not constitute sufficient evidence to warrant the jury 
finding him guilty of entering therein with intent to 
commit larceny to the exclusion of every other reasonable 
hypothesis. Since nothing was taken from the building 
his mere presence within the same cannot conclusively 
be relied upon as to an intention to enter therein to ste.al, 
commit theft or larceny. For what purpose the defend-
ant entered the building cannot be presumed upon these 
facts alone as one with the intent to commit larceny. 
There may be other reasonable hypothesis for the jury 
to find the defendant entered with innocent purposes, 
perhaps to seclude himself from his quarreling and argu-
ing wife, or bec.ause he was under the influence of intoxi-
cants, and was not capable of formulating any felonious 
intent, or to seclude himself from the rest of the party 
with whom he was with, or for the purpose of using a 
toilet. It is the contention that his presence in the build-
ing with the intent to commit larceny therein has not 
been proved by the State. That state's c.ase wholly fails 
in this regard as gathered from the facts and circum-
stances of this case. He should be given every benefit 
and intendment of the law that his presence within the 
building constituted merely a simple civil trespass, and 
that the state has failed to prove an intent to break in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
and enter the building with the intent to commit la1·ceny 
therein as charged in the information. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN S. HATCH 
A. 1\L MARSDEN 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Defendant 
616 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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